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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Nicole Gneiting was stopped, arrested, and searched incident to arrest.

Despite

suspicions that Ms. Gneiting had an item of contraband down her pants, the officers waited until
she was at the jail before they conducted a full search. During the full search at the jail, officers
located methamphetamine on Ms. Gneiting's person. Therefore, she was charged with both
trafficking and introduction of contraband into a jail.

After a jury trial, Ms. Gneiting was

convicted of trafficking, introduction of contraband, and possession of a controlled substance,
Xanax. The district court sentenced Ms. Gneiting to an aggregated term of fifteen years, with
three and one-half years fixed.
Ms. Gneiting contends the State's evidence was insufficient to establish that she
introduced major contraband into a jail. Idaho appellate Courts have yet to address the issue of
what mens rea is required to find a defendant guilty of introducing contraband into a correctional
facility, where the defendant brought the contraband into the facility upon their initial arrest. To
put it another way, does a defendant have the requisite mens rea to commit the crime where they
did not voluntarily enter the prison or correctional facility?

There is a split amongst other

jurisdictions on this question.
Predictably, the State has asserted that failing to disclose the presence of contraband
when provided an opportunity to do so satisfies the requisite mens rea for the offense of
introducing contraband into a jail. (Resp. Br., pp.7-16.) The State's arguments do not withstand
scrutiny where they fail to properly consider the arrestee's constitutional right against selfincrimination and the involuntariness of the arrestee's presence inside the correctional facility.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Gneiting's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Was there sufficient evidence that Ms. Gneiting knowingly introduced major contraband into a
jail?

3

ARGUMENT
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
Ms. Gneiting Introduced Major Contraband Into A Jail
The State contends that an arrestee voluntarily brings contraband into a jail, if they fail to
reveal the contraband to officers prior to entering the facility, after being given an opportunity to
do so. (Resp. Br., pp.7-16.) The State relies on State v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d 455 (Or. App. 2002) in
which the Oregon Court of Appeals pointed out that the State could have met the voluntariness
element by presenting evidence that the defendant was able to choose to take a particular action,
such as whether to tum over contraband when asked by the jailer. (Resp. Br., p.16.) The State
posits an "ability to choose" argument, citing to Tippetts, and claiming "it is the central argument
here." (Resp. Br., p.16.) However, such an interpretation of the establishment of mens rea may
often implicate a defendant's right against self-incrimination, and would not constitute a true
voluntary choice. Further, such a position would be contrary to recent decisions by the Idaho
Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals pertaining to self-incrimination. See State v.

Akins, 164 Idaho 74, 77 (2018) (holding "her compliance with any obligation imposed by the
statute [governing duty to report a death] would have forced her to provide potentially selfincriminating information"); State v. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho 534, 540 (2016) (holding the district
court's relinquishment of jurisdiction in response to the defendant's refusal to take a polygraph
examination unconstitutionally penalized the defendant for asserting his Fifth Amendment
privilege); State v. Powell, 161 Idaho 774 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding defendant's statements were
compelled in a classic penalty situation, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights).
In Akins, the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const.
amend. V. The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has been

4

incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); see also Idaho
Const. art. I, § 13. In its application, the privilege "protects against any
disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal
prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used." Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).
Akins, 164 Idaho at 76-77.

The position advanced by the State places Ms. Gneiting in the untenable position of
either revealing to officers that she had a controlled substance on her person, thereby admitting
she knowingly possessed a trafficking-level amount of methamphetamine, or remaining silent
and waiting for it to be discovered at the jail, thereby opening herself up to an additional felony
charge of introducing contraband in a jail. This is not a choice at all. Idaho Courts have recently
held that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a defendant from a "classic penalty
situation" which occurs when an individual is faced with the government's implied or expressed
assertion that invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights will lead to a substantial penalty. See
Powell, 161 Idaho at 778. Thus, the act of asserting the privilege is penalized so as to "foreclose

a free choice to remain silent." Id. Ms. Gneiting found herself in a classic penalty situation and
so denied having any contraband on her person. 1 However, such does not make her guilty of
voluntarily bringing the methamphetamine into a jail.

1

In Powell, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
[A]n individual's failure to affirmatively assert his or her Fifth Amendment
privilege does not necessarily preclude its benefit. The United States Supreme
Court has previously held that a defendant's failure to affirmatively invoke Fifth
Amendment protections may be excused in situations where that individual is
denied a "free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer." The Court has
recognized that such coercion occurs where the very assertion of the privilege is
penalized so as to "foreclose a free choice to remain silent." Such circumstances
are commonly referred to as a "classic penalty situation." To constitute a penalty
situation, the individual must be faced with the government's assertion, either
expressly or impliedly, that invocation of the Fifth Amendment will lead to a
substantial penalty.
5

The State also relies on Barrera v. State, 403 P.3d 1025 (Wyo. 2017), for that court's
conclusion that, "an arrestee who has been given the opportunity to tum over contraband before
entering a correctional facility makes a voluntary choice to continue to possess the contraband at
the risk of subsequent detection and a more severe penalty." (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) However, in
Barrera, the dissent is more well-reasoned and persuasive, giving due consideration to the

application of the privilege against self-incrimination:
An act may be voluntary if the actor has a choice to not commit the act, but
declines that choice and goes ahead with the act. The State argues that the officers
gave Mr. Barrera a choice to not "take" the controlled substance into the jail when
they advised him on several occasions that "he would be strip searched at the jail
and that it would be a felony if he was concealing any narcotics on his person and
if he took it into the jail." The option the officers gave Mr. Barrera was to confess
to possession (assuming he remembered that he had the small amount of
controlled substance in his coin pocket). In fact, they required him to confess or
face a felony charge. Mr. Barrera's response did not indicate that he intended to
take controlled substances into the jail. Rather, it only indicated he either was
unaware of the controlled substance or he wished to avoid self-incrimination.
Id. 403 P .3d at 1031 (Kautz, J., dissenting.)

In disagreeing with the State of Wyoming's position that it is acceptable for officers to
require a defendant to confess to possession in order to avoid facing felony charges, the dissent
wrote that "Mr. Barrera did not have a valid option to not have the controlled substance in his
possession when he was taken into the jail.

The questions posed by the officers did not

constitute a valid option for Mr. Barrera which indicated he voluntarily was taking controlled
substances into the jail." Id. 403 P.3d at 1032. Further, the dissent noted that, as a matter of
policy, "The approach advanced by the State here not only interferes with the privilege against
self-incrimination, it encourages officers to incarcerate individuals who are arrested for the most
minor of crimes, in the hopes that a further search produces evidence of a felony." Id. He noted,

Id. 161 Idaho at 778 (internal citations omitted.)
6

"If the State can require anyone taken into a county jail to confess to possession or face a felony

charge, officers have incentive to take everyone to jail." Id.
The State takes this reasoning one step further, by quoting the language of the statute and
(incorrectly) assuming that Ms. Gneiting is arguing that a person involuntarily entering a
correctional facility or jail may never be convicted of violating LC. § 18-2510(3)(a). (Resp.
Br., p.14.) However, a finding that the State did not meet its burden to prove Ms. Gneiting
possessed contraband in a jail does not negate a finding of voluntariness in other circumstances,
such as where the evidence shows that the arrestee knew he or she would be arrested and
intentionally hid contraband upon their person prior to arrest. See State v. Thaxton, 79 P .3d 897
(Or. Ct. App. 2003) (a jury could find that, at the time a defendant hid some marijuana in his
sock, he knew that the officers were likely to arrest him and take him to jail). As the dissenting
opinion in Barrera explained:
There may be situations where an individual going into jail involuntarily
nevertheless has voluntarily taken controlled substances there. The majority
opinion provides the example of an inmate on work release who voluntarily
chooses to bring controlled substances with him into the jail upon his return from
work. Perhaps someone might know they are going to be arrested, and conceal
controlled substances in a manner indicating they hoped to somehow get them
into the jail. Such circumstances could support a conclusion that the actor chose,
or was acting voluntarily, in taking the controlled substances into a jail.
Barrera, 403 P.3d 1025, 1032-33 (Wyo. 2017).

Further, the policy of this jail, and likely most jails, is to conduct a "strip search" if law
enforcement believes the arrestee has contraband hidden on their person. (Tr., p.188, L.19 p.189, L.3.) In fact, it is the the Bonneville County Jail's policy that persons checking in to serve
jail time over the weekend will be strip searched, because those inmates know they will be
coming into the jail facility. (Tr., p.188, L.24 - p.189, L.3.) Thus, the State's concern that no

7

arrestee or inmate involuntarily brought to a jail or correctional facility could ever be convicted
of this offense is entirely unfounded. (See Resp. Br., p.14.)
To eliminate concerns regarding an arrestee's constitutional right against selfincrimination and to properly determine the voluntariness of a defendant's presence in an
enhancement zone, Idaho appellate courts should adopt the rationale of states such as
Washington, New Mexico, Alabama, Maryland, Oregon, and Ohio. See e.g., Martin v. State, 17
So.2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944) (holding that an accusation of public intoxication cannot be
established where an intoxicated defendant was involuntarily and forcibly carried into the street
by an arresting officer); Fontaine v. State, 762 A.2d 1027 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding
that after a defendant was arrested in Delaware and taken to Maryland by the police, the
evidence failed to prove that he intended to distribute marijuana in his possession while in
Maryland). State v. Eaton, 177 P.3d 157, 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (holding "[t]he State should
not be allowed to physically force a subject into an enhancement zone and then be permitted to
choose whether he will be penalized for possessing contraband in the enhancement zone or the
non-enhancement zone in which his possession could also be established."), ajf'd, 229 P.3d 704
(Wash. 2010); State v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d 455, 457, 459-60 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing
conviction and holding evidence did not show defendant committed voluntary act where he was
arrested and taken to jail with marijuana in his pants pocket; "the contraband was introduced into
the jail only because the police took defendant (and the contraband) there against his will");
State v. Cole, 164 P.3d 1024, 1026-27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that "to be found guilty of

bringing contraband into a jail ... a person must enter the jail voluntarily"); State v. SoWJY, 803
N.E. 2d 867, 870 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding defendant could not be liable for conveying
drugs into the detention facility where he had no control over his person once arrested).

8

Idaho

law

required

the

State

to

establish

that

Ms.

Gneiting

voluntarily

possessed/introduced contraband into a jail. This it did not do where Ms. Gneiting was arrested
and brought to the jail against her will and where there was no evidence she knew she would be
taken to jail. Further, her actions in not implicating herself in criminal wrongdoing by revealing
the existence of the methamphetamine did not constitute a voluntary act sufficient to support a
conviction for violating LC. § 18-2510.

As such, the jury's verdict was not based upon

substantial evidence and the judgment of conviction must be vacated.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Gneiting respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment and remand this case to
the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for possession of contraband
within a jail.
DATED this 6th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of February, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas
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